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Introduction
Kohlberg and Mertens [12] propose that Nash's [21, 22] criterion of equilibrium in a noncooperative game should be refined by applying principles from decision theory.
1
Here we apply three axioms from decision theory adapted to games with perfect recall. In brief, these axioms require a refinement that selects connected closed subsets of equilibria to satisfy:
• Admissibility: Players' strategies are admissible optimal replies.
• Backward Induction: Selected subsets contain sequential equilibria.
• Small Worlds: Selected subsets are not affected by embedding the game within larger games that preserve players' strategies and payoffs.
These are among criteria proposed by Kohlberg and Mertens [12] and Mertens [20] , although we invoke a stronger version of small worlds. Our version excludes dependence on outsiders whose presence and actions enable new pure strategies equivalent to mixed strategies in the original game. Small worlds excludes framing effects that could occur if a refinement were sensitive to the wider context in which a game is embedded. We apply these axioms to the class of games with two players, perfect information, and generic payoffs. We prove that a refinement must select stable subsets of equilibria as defined by Mertens [18, 19] . Mertens establishes for general games the converse that a refinement that selects stable sets satisfies the axioms. Hence the axioms characterize stability as a solution concept for games with two players, perfect information, and generic payoffs.
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Any refinement that satisfies admissibility and backward induction but is more restrictive than stability must therefore violate small worlds, e.g. by restricting the class of larger games in which a game can be embedded. Section 2 establishes notation for Section 3, which specifies Axioms A (admissibility), B (backward induction), and S (small worlds), including a precise definition of embedding a game in a larger game. The axioms are stated for general games in extensive form with perfect recall. Section 4 summarizes implications of the axioms for games with two players, perfect information, and generic payoffs, and provides an example. Section 5 establishes notation for this class of games and states some useful properties, including a key technical proposition proved in Appendix A. Section 6 states and proves the main theorem. The proof is constructive in that each equilibrium in a stable set is shown to be induced by an admissible sequential equilibrium of a particular larger game in extensive form with perfect recall (but with imperfect information and nongeneric payoffs) in which the given game is embedded. Section 7 provides concluding remarks and another example.
Notation
A typical game in extensive form is denoted Γ. Its specification includes a set N of players, a game tree that has perfect recall for each player, and a real-valued payoff u n (z) to each player n at each node z in the set Z of terminal nodes of the tree. The tree can include a specified mixed strategy of Nature. As usual, payoffs are assumed to be von NeumannMorgenstern utilities. We assume throughout the standard epistemic conditions that the game is common knowledge and players' rationality is common knowledge.
Strategies and Expected Payoffs.
In the normal-form representation of the game, a player's pure strategy specifies the action chosen at each of his information sets in the game tree. However, outcomes are not affected by a strategy's actions at information sets excluded by his previous actions. Thus it suffices to specify a pure strategy by the terminal nodes that are not excluded by his actions.
This specification is formalized as follows [4] . A pure strategy of a player does not exclude a terminal node z from being reached if at each of his information sets that intersect the path to z it chooses his unique action on that path. Alternatively, the player might randomize over his pure strategies, or he might use a behavioral strategy that randomizes over actions at each of his information sets.
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A randomized strategy of either kind induces a probability distribution over the terminal nodes that are not excluded. Here we take the set P n ⊂ [0, 1] Z of these probability distributions as player n's set of strategies, called his mixed strategies. 4 If p n ∈ P n then p n (z) is the probability that his actions do not exclude z, and these probabilities uniquely determine a corresponding behavioral strategy at his information sets that his prior actions do not exclude.
Player n's set P n of mixed strategies is a closed convex polyhedron. Its vertices are obtained from profiles of pure strategies of the normal form. Let P = n P n be the set of profiles of players' mixed strategies. Note that P depends only on the game tree and summarizes its essential features. 3 Kuhn [17] shows that these yield the same distributions of outcomes when the game has perfect recall. A randomization over pure strategies induces a unique behavior at each information set it does not exclude, and for every behavioral strategy there exist randomizations over pure strategies that, for each profile of others' strategies, yields the same probability distribution over terminal nodes. 4 P n is called n's set of enabling strategies in [4, 8] . Mertens [20, p. 554] introduces the technique of mapping randomized strategies to their induced probability distributions on terminal nodes. Koller and Megiddo [14] call them realization plans, and Koller, Megiddo, and von Stengel [15] use them for efficient computation.
If p ∈ P then the probability that terminal node z is the outcome of the game is π(z|p) = p * (z) n p n (z), where p * (z) is the probability that Nature's actions do not exclude z, because Nature and the players randomize independently. Hence player n's expected payoff is G n (p) = z π(z|p)u n (z). Thus the extensive-form game Γ is summarized by the multilinear function G : P → R N that to each profile of players' mixed strategies assigns their expected payoffs. This summary specification is called the strategic form of the game.
2.2. Equilibria and Refinements. Adapting Nash's [21, 22] definition, an equilibrium of a game in strategic form is a profile p ∈ P of players' mixed strategies such that each player's strategy is an optimal reply to others' strategies. That is, for each player n, G n (p) G n (p n , p −n ) for every p n ∈ P n . Note that each equilibrium by this definition corresponds to a family of equivalent equilibria, represented by either behavioral strategies or randomizations over normal-form pure strategies, that have the same distribution over outcomes.
A refinement is a correspondence that assigns to each game a nonempty collection of nonempty closed connected subsets of its equilibria. Each selected subset is called a solution.
We assume that solutions are sets because Kohlberg and Mertens [12, pp. 1015, 1019, 1029] show that there need not exist a single equilibrium that satisfies weaker assumptions than the axioms invoked here. The technical requirement that a solution is connected excludes the trivial refinement that always selects the set of all equilibria. If payoffs are generic then all equilibria in a connected subset yield the same probability distribution over terminal nodes, and thus the same paths of equilibrium play in the extensive form.
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In this case, connectedness associates solutions with selections of probability distributions over outcomes.
Axioms
This section presents the three axioms. The first two invoke principles of rational decisions by individual players. The third axiom requires that a refinement is not affected by extraneous features of contexts in which a game is presented. 3.1. Admissibility. For a game with two players, a player's strategy is admissible iff it is not weakly dominated in terms of expected payoffs by another strategy. In this case admissibility is the same as in decision theory. We consider games with more than two players, however, so we assume the stronger property that a strategy is an admissible reply. Definition 3.1 (Admissible Reply). A player's strategy is an admissible reply to a profile p ∈ P if it is an optimal reply to each profile in some sequence in the interior of P for which p is a limit point.
An equivalent decision-theoretic specification is obtained by Blume, Brandenburger, and Dekel [1] and Govindan and Klumpp [2] . They use randomizations over normal-form pure strategies but their results apply also to the strategic form of a game. A player's strategy is an admissible reply to p iff it is a lexicographically optimal reply to a representation of other players' strategies by a lexicographic probability systemp . For a game in extensive form this condition requires that, at each information set his own strategy does not exclude, continuation of his strategy is a lexicographically optimal reply to the profile of others' strategies in the sequencep
is the first profile in the system that does not exclude that information set from being reached.
Say that a profile p ∈ P of players' strategies is admissible if each player n's strategy p n is an admissible reply to p. When there are more than two players, this is much weaker than requiring that p results from a perfect equilibrium, which requires that the justifying sequence in Definition 3.1 is the same for all players.
Axiom A (Admissibility): Each equilibrium in a solution is admissible.
3.2. Backward Induction. The second axiom invokes consistent beliefs and sequential equilibria as defined by Kreps and Wilson [16, p. 872 ].
Definition 3.2 (Consistent Beliefs)
. A player's belief assigns to each of his information sets a probability distribution over the nodes at this information set. Players' beliefs are consistent with an equilibrium if they are limits of conditional probabilities induced by a sequence of profiles of completely mixed strategies converging to the equilibrium. This definition of consistent beliefs appears to depart from standard decision theory because it invokes perturbed strategies, but Kohlberg and Reny [13] show that consistency of beliefs can be derived from primitive axioms appropriate for a frequency interpretation of probabilities. We adhere to Kreps and Wilson [16] definition of sequential equilibrium in terms of behavioral strategies.
Definition 3.3 (Sequential Equilibrium
). An equilibrium in behavioral strategies is sequential if there exists a profile of consistent beliefs such that, conditional on a player's belief at an information set, continuation of his behavioral strategy is an optimal reply to other players' strategies.
Govindan and Klumpp [2, Section 5] observe that a sequential equilibrium can be represented by a lexicographic probability system. The optimality property in Definition 3.3 is called sequential rationality. If continuation is required to be optimal only at his information sets that the player's own strategy does not exclude then it is called weak sequential rationality by Reny [23] .
The second axiom requires that some equilibrium in a solution is sequential.
Axiom B (Backward Induction): Each solution contains an equilibrium implied by a sequential equilibrium.
That is, a solution must contain an equilibrium p such that, for some sequential equilibrium, each p n (z) is the product of player n's behavioral probabilities of choosing his actions on the path to z. For the games with perfect information and generic payoffs studied later, Axiom B requires that a solution contains a subgame-perfect equilibrium constructed by backward induction, which is a special case of a sequential equilibrium. For more general games we interpret sequential equilibrium as the relevant generalization of backward induction.
3.3. Small Worlds. Equilibria of a game depend only on its strategic form. The analogous property of a refinement is called invariance. As in decision theory, invariance requires that it is irrelevant whether a randomization over pure strategies is treated as an additional pure strategy. Similarly, equilibria are not affected by adding dummy players, i.e. 'outsiders' whose actions do not affect strategies and payoffs of 'insiders' who are the players in the given game. The analogous property of a refinement is called 'small worlds' by Mertens [20] . This property too is familiar in decision theory where one excludes dependence on payoffirrelevant events (Savage [24] ). When invariance and small worlds are adopted as axioms, they require that a refinement is not affected by two particular presentation effects, i.e. embeddings of the given game in larger games with redundant pure strategies or dummy players.
The axiom adopted here excludes a refinement from depending on more general presentation effects. We use the same name, small worlds, but consider more general embeddings. For notational simplicity, we use the strategic form of a game to state the axiom. Thus, as in Section 2, a game Γ is summarized by a multilinear function G : P → R N that to each profile of players' mixed strategies assigns expected payoffs to the players in N .
As mentioned, the purpose of the axiom is to prevent refinements from depending on wider contexts in which a game is played, provided a context does not alter players' feasible strategies and payoffs. By a context we mean here a 'larger' gameG :
which game G is embedded, subject to certain restrictions specified below. The larger gamẽ G has outsiders in a set o, in addition to insiders who are the players in N , and there can be additional moves by Nature. Also, an insider n can have additional pure strategies inG that are not pure strategies in G.
The basic requirement is that an embedding should not alter the game among insiders, conditional on any specific strategies of outsiders. Restrictions on an embedding should therefore ensure that outsiders' strategies are not payoff-relevant for insiders, and that insiders' additional pure strategies are redundant-although translation from a pure strategy inG to a mixed strategy in G might depend on outsiders' strategies.
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These restrictions have a technical formulation. There should exist a multilinear map f :P × P o → P that is surjective and such thatG n = G n • f for each insider n. Moreover, to exclude an embedding from enabling insiders to coordinate their strategies, f should factor into separate multilinear maps (f n ) n∈N , where each component is a map f n :
Admittedly, a statement of the axiom that uses this technical language could contain unsuspected implications. However, after stating the formal definition, we provide in Proposition 3.5 an equivalent formulation that is more detailed and more transparent, and that verifies the requisite properties. Also, Proposition 3.6 applies a precise test of whether the axiom is correctly stated-a refinement that satisfies the axiom should be immune to the same embeddings that equilibria are.
Definition 3.4 (Embedding). A gameG :P
and a collection of multilinear maps f n :P n × P o → P n , one for each player n ∈ N , embed a game G :
Condition (a) ensures that embedding has no net effect on an insider's set of mixed strategies, conditional on outsiders' strategies, and condition (b) ensures that there is no net effect on any insider's payoffs. Proposition 3.5 below elaborates this interpretation in terms of pure strategies.
Hereafter, ifG embeds G via maps f = (f n ) then we say that (G, f ) embeds G and thatG is a metagame for G. We omit description of f for metagames in extensive form that embed a game in extensive or strategic form. An elaborate example of a metagame in extensive form that embeds a game in extensive form is constructed in proving Theorem 6.1.
Invariance uses the special case in which o and P o are singletons and each f maps pure strategies ofG to equivalent pure or mixed strategies of G. Mertens' small worlds criterion uses the special case in whichP = P and each f n is the projection map to P n . In these two cases,P ⊇ P , but embedding allows more general versions that are identified precisely in Proposition 3.5 below.
A multilinear map f n :P n × P o → P n is completely specified by its values at vertices of P n × P o , which recall are images of pure strategies of the normal form. LetP (2) assures that players' payoffs from vertices of G are preserved by the metagameG.
Vertices inP
• n \T n are redundant because payoffs from profiles in nT n exactly replicate payoffs from corresponding profiles in n P
• n for the embedded game G. In particular, if f
• n is equivalent for insiders to the mixed strategy p n in P n . Thus, conditional on each profile p • o of outsiders' vertices, embedding preserves the strategic form of the game among insiders.
Proof of Proposition. Suppose we have a gameG :
and a collection of multilinear maps f n :P n × P o → P n , one for each n ∈ N , such that conditions (1) and (2) of the proposition are satisfied. Then, by condition (1) and multilinearity of f n for each n,
is surjective because it maps the convex hull ofT n onto P n . Also, condition (2) and multilinearity of each f n imply thatG = G • f . According to Definition 3.4, therefore, (G, f ) embeds G. Now suppose that (G, f ) embeds G. Let p o be a profile of completely mixed strategies for outsiders. Because f n is multilinear it induces a linear mapping f n (·, p o ) fromP n to P n that is surjective by the definition of embedding. Hence, for each p
, which is an average of values at vertices of P
• n and let h n be the associated bijection. Define f (1) and (2) of the proposition are satisfied. Now we apply the aforementioned test and verify that equilibria are not affected by embedding in a metagame. Proof. Suppose (p, p o ) is an equilibrium ofG and let p = f (p, p o ). For any insider n and his
where the inequality obtains because (p, p o ) is an equilibrium ofG. Hence p is an equilibrium of G. Conversely, suppose p is an equilibrium of G. For each n, express p n as a convex combination
For each n, let h n be the bijection given by Proposition 3.5. Letp n be the strategy for insider n inG given by α(p
Hence, it suffices to show that there exists a strategy profile p o for outsiders such that (p, p o ) is an equilibrium ofG. By fixing the profile of insiders' strategies to bep one induces a game among outsiders. Let p o be an equilibrium of this induced game among outsiders. To see that (p, p o ) is an equilibrium ofG, observe that for each vertexp
• n of an insider n:
where the first and second equalities use the property f (p, ·) = p established above, and the inequality obtains because p is an equilibrium of G.
A corollary of Proposition 3.6 is that embedding does not introduce correlation among insiders' strategies.
Using Definition 3.4 of embedding, the small worlds axiom is the following.
Axiom S (Small Worlds): If (G, f ) embeds G then the f -images of the solutions that a refinement selects forG are the solutions selected for G.
In view of Proposition 3.6, this axiom is an instance of the general principle that a refinement should inherit invariance properties of equilibria.
3.4. Summary of the Axioms. We study refinements that are independent of embeddings in metagames that, for each profile of outsiders' strategies, preserve the strategic form of the game among insiders. And, we require that their solutions are closed connected subsets of admissible equilibria that contain sequential equilibria. In particular, a solution of a metagame must contain an admissible sequential equilibrium whose image is in the corresponding solution of the embedded game. Mertens [18, 19] proves for general games that stable sets of equilibria satisfy Axiom A, Axiom B, invariance, and his version of small worlds. A modification of his proof extends this conclusion to Axiom S.
Games with Perfect Information
The remainder of this paper applies Axioms A, B, and S to the class of games with two players, perfect information, and generic payoffs. A game in this class is called a PI game for simplicity.
In this section we summarize immediate implications of the axioms for PI games, and describe the main theorem that is stated and proved in Section 6. We also provide a simple example that illustrates the content of the theorem and the key property that is the focus of the proof. 4.1. Implications of the Axioms for PI Games. A PI game has special features. It has a unique sequential equilibrium. This is the subgame-perfect equilibrium obtained by backward induction, and it uses only pure strategies. Moreover, this equilibrium is included in the unique essential component [6] of the game's equilibria. Within this component is the unique essential component of admissible equilibria.
The theorem in Section 6 shows that a refinement satisfying the axioms selects a unique solution for each PI game. This solution is the entire component of admissible equilibria that contains the subgame-perfect equilibrium. In particular, Axiom A requires that a solution contains only admissible equilibria-which for two-player games are the weakly undominated strategies-and Axiom B requires that the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium is included in each solution. A solution must therefore be a connected closed subset of the component of admissible equilibria that contains the subgame-perfect equilibrium. The remarkable aspect of Theorem 6.1 is that every equilibrium in the component of admissible equilibria must be included in a solution. This is necessary to account for all the metagames in which the PI game can be embedded. In other words, the theorem shows that stability against every perturbation of players' strategies is equivalent to immunity to embeddings in metagames, as required by Axiom S.
An Example.
We use an example to illustrate what is required for a proof. Figure  1 shows an example of a PI game Γ. There are two components of its equilibria. One component is inessential and all its equilibria are inadmissible. On the equilibrium path, 1 chooses In, then 2 chooses C, and then 1 chooses a. This equilibrium path is sustained by 1's inadmissible strategies that choose b with sufficiently high probability after 2's choice of L. Either Axiom A or B excludes a solution from residing in this component.
The other component is essential and its equilibrium path is sustained by admissible equilibria. It contains the subgame-perfect equilibrium in which 1 chooses Out, anticipating that after In she would choose a after each choice by 2, which optimally for 2 is to choose L. This component's four extreme points are identified by 2's strategies labeled L, R, CR, LC in Table 1 . To illustrate requirements for stability, we show examples of equilibria of nearby games obtained by perturbing player 1's strategies. Figure 2 shows the graph of admissible equilibria over an interval of perturbations, constructed as follows. Represent a behavioral strategy for player 1 by a vector . The figure implies that, besides 2's choice of L in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, a stable set must also include each extreme point LC, CR, and R, since each is the limit of admissible equilibria of perturbed games.
Theorem 6.1 below shows that the axioms imply that indeed all four of 2's extreme points and their mixtures must be included in a solution. The method of proof is to show that if some point in the convex hull of these four extreme points is not included in a proposed solution, then there exists a metagame (Γ, f ) in extensive form that embeds Γ and for which the f -images of admissible sequential equilibria lie outside this proposed solution-thus Axioms B and S require that the solution includes the entire convex hull.
A key step of the proof modifies the game Γ by adding the redundant strategy for player 1 that is shown in Figure 3 . In this expanded game, after player 1 initially rejects Out but before committing to In, she can choose Reconsider, which implements the strategy that with probability 1 − δ chooses Out and with probability δ chooses In and then implements the behavioral strategy b x 1 at her information sets that follow player 2's responses to In. The information set for player 2 indicates that he cannot know whether 1 chose In or Reconsider. When δ is sufficiently small, in any equilibrium of the subgame that follows 1's initial rejection of Out, player 1 must choose Reconsider with positive probability because it is nearly as advantageous as Out. The expanded game therefore simulates the effect of perturbing the strategies of player 1 (other than Out, which is her equilibrium strategy in Γ). The proof in Section 6 also introduces outsiders whose strategies determine which behavioral strategy b x 1 is implemented if player 1 chooses Reconsider and the outcome again rejects Out. This behavioral strategy determines which admissible equilibrium results in the expanded game. Player 2 is also provided options to reconsider his choices.
Notation and Properties of PI Games
In this section we establish notation and properties specific to PI games. We now use Γ to denote a typical PI game. The set of players is N = {1, 2}. Represent the game tree as (X, ≺), where X is the set of nodes and ≺ is the relation of precedence. As before, Z ⊂ X is the set of terminal nodes and payoffs are given by a point u in U = R N ×Z , where u n (z) is the payoff to player n ∈ N at terminal node z ∈ Z. We assume throughout that payoffs are generic, i.e. u ∈ U \ U • where the excluded set U • is a lower-dimensional set of payoffs derived in [3] .
5.1. Derivation of the Strategic Form. For completeness, we first derive the strategic form from the normal form of the game. Let X 0 be the set of nodes where Nature moves.
Assume that all of Nature's strategies have positive probability. For each player n, let X n be the set of nodes where player n moves. For each node x ∈ X n , let A n (x) be the set of actions available to player n at x. Assuming actions at all nodes are labeled differently, let A n be the set of all actions of player n. Then the set S n of n's normal-form pure strategies is the set of functions s n : X n → A n such that s n (x) ∈ A n (x) for each x ∈ X n . Let Σ n be the simplex of randomizations over S n .
For each player n, his pure strategy s n ∈ S n , and any node y ∈ X, let β n (y, s n ) be the probability that s n does not exclude y, i.e. β n (y, s n ) = 1 if s n (x) = a for every (x, a) ≺ y such that x ∈ X n and a ∈ A n (x), and otherwise β n (y, s n ) = 0. Extend β n (y, ·) to a function over n's simplex Σ n of randomized strategies via β n (y, σ n ) = sn∈Sn β n (y, s n )σ n (s n ). Similarly, let β * (y) be the probability that Nature does not exclude y. Then the probability that a profile s ∈ S of pure strategies does not exclude y is β(y, s) = β * (y)β 1 (y, s 1 )β 2 (y, s 2 ). Because Nature and players move independently, the function β extends similarly to profiles of randomized strategies via β(y, σ) = β * (y)β 1 (y, σ 1 )β 2 (y, σ 2 ). Player n's expected payoff from a profile s ∈ S of players' pure strategies is z∈Z β(z, s)u n (z), and from a profile σ ∈ Σ of randomized strategies it is z∈Z β(z, σ)u n (z).
Define maps ρ = (ρ n ) n∈N where for each player n, ρ n :
be the image of ρ n and let P = n P n . Then P n is the set of n's mixed strategies of the strategic form as defined in Section 2. Given a pro-
is the probability that n's strategy does not exclude z. As in Section 2, the multilinear map G : P → R N is the strategic form of Γ.
Stable Sets.
Recall that for a two-player game a strategy is admissible iff it is not weakly dominated. Also, because Γ has perfect information and payoffs are generic, there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium s * , and all equilibria in the same component as s * induce the same distribution of outcomes. Therefore, let Σ * be the unique component of admissible equilibria that contains s * . Every stable set of Γ is contained in Σ * . Moreover, Σ * is itself stable [5] . Let P * be the image of Σ * under ρ, and let P * n be its projection into P n . 5.3. Subgames after Deviations. For each node x ∈ X, β(x, σ) is the same, say β * (x), for all σ ∈ Σ * . Let X * be the subset of nodes such that β * (x) > 0, and for each n let X * n = X n ∩ X * . Similarly, let Z * ⊂ Z be the set of terminal nodes for which β * (z) > 0. By genericity, at each node x ∈ X * n player n chooses the same action a * (x) ∈ A n (x) in all equilibria in Σ * . Therefore, for each z ∈ Z * both players choose all their actions on the path to z with probability one, i.e. for each player n, p * n (z) = 1 for all p * n ∈ P * n and thus
, let x ∈ X \ X 0 be the last node preceding z such that β * (x) > 0. Then x ∈ X * m for some player m and z follows x by m's choice of some action a ∈ A m (x), a = a * (x). In the subgame following a, if player n has no move then by genericity a is an inferior action for m against all equilibria in P * and thus p * m (z) = 0 and p * n (z) = 1 for all z following a-but if player n does have a move following a then p * n (z) might differ among equilibria in P * . To summarize the preceding paragraph, for each player n and each p * and n has no move following m's choice a at x that leads to z. Thus the only indeterminacy is when in the latter case player n has a move after player m chooses the non-equilibrium action a at x. This motivates the following constructions. Because Γ has perfect information, each node y ∈ X \ Z initiates a subgame that we denote Γ y . For each player n, let X
• n be the set of nodes y ∈ X \ X * such that the immediate predecessor x of y belongs to X * n , and in the subgame Γ y that starts at y, player n has some node where he moves. (Note that y need not belong to X n : it merely has the property that its predecessor belongs to X * m and the action there leading to y is a non-equilibrium action.) Let X ; the reverse inclusion being obvious, the first statement is proved.
As for the second statement, since strategies in P * n vary only across terminal nodes that follow some y ∈ X • n , the projection from P * n to y P y, * n is injective. To prove that it is surjective, take a strategy p
5.4. The Pseudo-Manifold Property. We conclude the setup by stating a key technical property that enables the Hopf extension theorem to be invoked in the proof of Theorem 6.1.
Let A The proof is in Appendix A. 8 An interpretation is that the profile p y represents players' initial beliefs about each other's strategy after the deviation at y, and q y is the updated profile obtained by anticipating that with some probabilities λ they will voluntarily choose strategies r y that are optimal replies to each other's initial and updated beliefs. The conditions for m and n are asymmetric because m's voluntary part r y m replies optimally mainly to n's equilibrium strategy q y n ∈ P y, * n because only with arbitrarily small probability ε will m's initial deviation at x be followed by a second deviation by n at y or later in the subgame Γ y . Proof. SupposeP is a solution in terms of mixed strategies that is selected by a refinement satisfying the axioms. Then by Axioms A and B,P is contained in P *
Statement and Proof of the Theorem
. By Proposition 5.1, it is sufficient to prove for each pair of collections, one for each player n, of (q If m chooses to play into the subgame or Nature does so, then next player n gets to move, knowing only that play is now in the subgame Γ y , i.e. n knows that at each predecessor x ∈ X m of x, m chose the subgame-perfect equilibrium action a * chooses a vertex v y n that does not belong to the boundary of P y n ; (ii) the original players choose the actions at nodes preceding x that lead to x; m chooses a, which leads to y, and then either chooses not to revise her choice or Nature's choice leads back into Γ y ; (iii) player n chooses to revise his choice, and Nature implements the p y n -part of the mixture, i.e. the history has Nature not implementing the t y n part (the part implemented with probability (1 − δ) ). In the exceptional cases satisfying these three conditions, if o ). Also, let β i (x;τ ) be the probability that node x is enabled by insider i under the strategyτ , and let W y,δ n be the set of vertices of K n that do not belong to ∂P 
Concluding Remarks
Axiom S excludes refinements from depending on embeddings in metagames. The motivation for this axiom is to prevent refinements from being sensitive to presentation effects. Yet Theorem 6.1 shows that for PI games this axiom requires a solution to contain all admissible equilibria in the same component as the subgame-perfect equilibrium. Each equilibrium in this solution is included because it could occur as the insiders' strategies in a sequential equilibrium of a metagame in which the PI game is embedded.
One could argue that this conclusion contradicts the motivation for the axiom since, other than the subgame-perfect equilibrium, the admissible equilibria in the stable set are included precisely because they are occur as sequential equilibria of a metagame, which is a particular presentation effect. The implication we see is that the selection of a particular equilibrium can stem from an associated class of embeddings, but if the PI game is specified in isolation, without restricting the possible embeddings, then a refinement cannot exclude any equilibrium in the solution. Sufficiently rich detail about how the game is embedded might select a unique equilibrium of the game among insiders, but absent such context, one needs more information to select any proper subset of the solution.
One could also argue that the theorem is uninteresting because all equilibria in the solution of a PI game have the same outcome, namely the outcome of the subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this view, players' strategies after one deviates are irrelevant except that they must sustain players' incentives to stay on paths of equilibrium play. Our view is that it is important to understand how rational behavior is conditioned by one player's interpretation of the other's deviation, that is, by the beliefs that sustain the equilibrium in the ensuing subgame.
To illustrate, we repeat here an example in [7] that invokes only invariance, which is a weaker restriction than Axiom S. Figure 4 shows at the top a PI game Γ in which players 1 and 2 alternate moves. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium each player chooses down at each opportunity, which we represent by the pure strategy D, ignoring his subsequent choice were the player to deviate. There is a single component of the Nash equilibria in which 1 uses D and 2 uses any mixed strategy for which the probability of D is 2/3. The component of admissible equilibria requires further that 2's probability of a is zero. Figure 4 shows at the bottom the metagameΓ [12 − 3δ] . This is sustained by 2's belief at his first information set that the conditional probability that 1 chose x(δ) given that she rejected D is β(δ) = 2/[2 + δ]. By Bayes' Rule, the conditional probability that 1 chose x(δ) given that A occurred is p = 2/3.
A refinement that includes the sequential equilibrium of each metagameΓ is exactly C n (T ). By admissibility, there exists a point q n ∈ X n (T ) \ ∂P y n . There now exist points p n arbitrarily close to such a q n such that λp n + (1 − λ)r n belongs to X n (T ) for some 0 < λ < 1 and r n ∈ P y n (T y n ). Clearly p n has a neighborhood in the affine space generated by X n (T ) and P such thatλ −μ = 1,λ 1, whereλ = i λ n,i and
LetB n (T ) be the set of (λ, µ) such that r n (µ) and h n (λ, µ) belong to the convex cone spanned by P y n (T y n ) and P y n respectively (which immediately implies that q n (µ), as a linear combination of r n (λ, µ) and h n (λ, µ) also belongs to the convex cone of P has a dimension that is at least two less than that of X n (T y m ). As for (iii), suppose We need one more lemma concerning these sets B n (T ). Let C be a maximal face of C(T ). Let T n be the set of T n such that P 
, and again the result follows. We now show that B n (T ) = ∪ T B n (T ). Obviously for each T ∈ T , B n (T ) is contained in B n (T ) and ∪ T B n (T ) ⊆ B n (T ). To prove the reverse inequality, given p n ∈ B n (T ) expressed as λq n + (1 − λ)r n for some λ 1, q n ∈ X n (T Since T n is nonempty, there exists at least one maximal proper face P y n (T n ) such that C n (T ) = C . And, C n (T ) is not contained in any such face. Choose now r * n in the interior of C n (T ). r * n does not belong to any P y n (T n ) for T n ∈ T n . For the given p n , choose an expression p n = λq n + (1 − λ)r n . We can assume without loss of generality that q n is completely mixed, if necessary by replacing p n with a point that is arbitrarily close to it in B n (T ) and proving that this p n now belongs to B n (T y m , T n ) for some T n ∈ T n . For each 0 < α < 1, now let q n (α) = (1 − α)r n + αq n where r n is some point in the interior of C . Since q n is completely mixed, q n (α) is in the interior of P y n for all α. Therefore, for each α, there exists a unique λ(α) > 1 such that r n (α) ≡ λ(a)q n (α) + (1 − λ(a))r * n belongs to the boundary of P y n . For α close to zero, q n (α) is very close to r n , which belongs to the boundary of P y n (as it belongs to C which belongs to a face of proper face of P . Then, since C n (T ) = C , there are two possibilities. Either C n (T ) = C n (T ) or C n (T ) = C . In the former case, B belongs to the boundary of B n (T ). In the latter case, B is a maximal proper face of B n (T ). Case (iii) implies that for the face P n (T ) of P n (T y n ) such that for every p n ∈ B n (T ) expressed as some λq n + (1 − λ)r n , r n ∈ P n (T n ), C n (T n ) = C n (T ) = C . Thus, T n ∈ T n and B is a face of B n (T y m , T n ). If B n is a face of B n (T y m , T n ), the proof is analogous to the above arguments and hence omitted.
We turn now to an equivalent analysis of P m . Again fix the sets (T Fix a point r n in the relative interior of C n (T ) and consider for fixed 0 < δ < 1 (which is to be specified later), the sequence q(ε) = (1 − ε)q n + ε((1 − δ)r n + δq n ). By the construction of A m (T ), the support of r m is contained in T y m , and the strategies T y m are optimal against q n and r n , both of which belong to C n (T ). Also they do equally well against q n and hence against q n (ε) for all ε. If s Suppose now that λ m = 0. Let T m be vertices of the face of P y m that contains r m in its interior. Since (1 − λ n )q n + λ n r n is a best reply against (1 − λ m )p m + λ m r m , which, like p m is in the interior of P y m , it is an admissible best reply against that strategy and thus (p m , q m ) ∈ A m (T ). We now have to show that (p n , q n ) belongs to A n (T ). Let q n (ε) ≡ (1 − ε)q n + ε((1 − λ n )p n + λ n r n ) be a sequence satisfying condition (ii). Then by weak sequential rationality, the strategies in T y m are best replies against q n and thus q n belongs to C n (T ). Thus there remains to show that p n belongs to A n (T ). To do this we need to show that there exists a point of the form λ n r n + (1 − λ n )p n against which the strategies in T . Consequently, any node x ∈ X m that is not excluded by q n nor by either r * m orr m , is enabled by the other as well and the actions prescribed by behavioral strategies equivalent to these two agree at such a node. If x ∈ X m is node that is excluded by q n , then it is enabled by (1 − λ n )p n + λ n r n , since p n is completely mixed; therefore, by weak sequential rationality of r m , if x is not excluded by r * m , then r * m prescribes choices at x that are optimal against (1 − λ n )p n + λ n r n . This implies that r * m is at least as good a reply asr m against q n (ε) for all ε, which implies that it is not dominated byr m as claimed. Thus p n ∈ A n (T ). To prove this last point, we show that if r m (resp. q n ) does not exclude a node of player m (resp. n) then the action prescribed by r m (resp. q n ) there coincides with the backward induction solution. The proof of this point is by backward induction on the tree. This is obviously true at all end-game nodes. So let y be a node of one of the players that is not excluded by that player and such that for all nodes following y our induction hypothesis holds. Suppose y is a node of m (the other case is analogous). If y is excluded by q n then it is enabled by p n , which is in the interior of P y n , and by construction of U , the backward induction choice at y is the response chosen by r m . If y is not excluded by q n then, by induction, q n prescribes the same continuation as q * n . Thus, the beliefs of player m at y are that n's play is dictated by some average of q * n and p n . By construction, the backward induction choice is the best reply against either of those two strategies for player n. So, the induction hypothesis holds at y . This concludes the proof of the Proposition.
